The Prospects for Corporate Governance Operating as a Vehicle for Social Change in South Africa by Miles, Lilian & Jones, Mariette
  
THE PROSPECTS FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OPERATING AS A VEHICLE 
FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
LILIAN MILES* 
MARIETTE JONES** 
 
A range of scholarly literature has emerged recently which discusses the 
extent to which the corporate governance regime in South Africa can 
incorporate the interests of stakeholders. This is a timely question in view of 
present movements toward such an approach in the country. At face value, 
adopting an approach which combines the interests of shareholders with 
those of stakeholders is ideal in a country which is trying to redress the 
extreme inequalities caused by exploitative and discriminative policies under 
the apartheid regime. But, as this article will argue, there are significant 
challenges to be met if this approach is to succeed. The article also questions 
whether, in the context of an emerging economy, companies are the most 
appropriate vehicle through which to promote the interests of employees, the 
environment, the local community and society at large. This article will be 
structured as follows. Part 1 describes the many socio-economic challenges 
facing the South African government. Part 2 discusses its corporate 
governance regime, which imposes a legal duty on directors to adopt an 
‘inclusive approach’ whilst managing their business and which continues to 
reiterate the value of good corporate citizenship and responsibility. Part 3 
addresses the difficulties which arise from the inclusive approach. Part 4, 
which concludes, argues that increased involvement of the state through 
legal regulation is crucial in order to create a more robust framework in 
which the needs of society can be met. 
 
I SOCIO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 
 
In April 1994, South Africa held its first democratic election, ending decades 
of apartheid rule. The majority black African National Congress (ANC) 
government that was elected inherited a diverse and multicultural society. The 
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population of South Africa today stands at 48 million, with Africans in the 
majority (80%), the white population at 9.1%, those of mixed race at 8.9% 
and the Indian/Asian population at 2.5%. 1  Its Constitution recognises 11 
official languages,2 although many more languages are commonly spoken.3
South Africa is currently the world’s 20th biggest economy. From 1994, the 
government channelled considerable effort into overhauling South Africa’s 
economy. The old economy was characterised by high tariffs and subsidies, 
anti-competitive behaviour and extensive government intervention. Today, 
this intervention has been reduced, with the government actively encouraging 
competition, investment and privatisation.
 
This apparent diversity has led the term ‘Rainbow Nation’, first coined by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to be commonly applied to South Africa’s people. 
4 The economy is growing at an 
annual rate of 3% – 5% with a relatively low rate of inflation. Trade and 
investment have been liberalised and public debt reduced. The government 
has also effected policy changes to encourage international investment and to 
promote its products and services on the global markets.5
The government has invested heavily in social and development programmes 
to ensure the provision of health, education, electricity, clean water and 
sanitation facilities. Deep divisions remain, however, within South African 
society. The new, democratically elected, ANC government inherited a 
fragmented and disparate society marked by extreme contrasts, which on the 
one hand boasted a highly developed infrastructure and an economy on a par 
with most developed nations, while on the other being impaired by high 
unemployment, a severe housing shortage, environmental degradation, 
spiralling violent crime, a low level of skills and one of the worst HIV/AIDS 
epidemics in the world.
 
6
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University. 
 To heighten the visibility of this ‘double economy’, 
** Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University. The authors would like to thank Professor 
Richard Croucher of Middlesex University and the anonymous referee for their help and 
valuable suggestions during the drafting of this article.  
1 South Africa’s Population (2008) 
<http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/population.htm > at 23 June 2009.  
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (SA) s 6(1). 
3 For example, the Constitution mentions the Khoi, Nama and San languages, Arabic, German, 
Greek, Gujarati, Hebrew, Hindi, Portuguese, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu.  
4 See its economic reform programme – Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy, which was put in place to cover the period 1996 – 2000. GEAR was implemented to 
increase investment, deregulation and trade liberalisation. 
5 For a discussion of South Africa’s economic progress, see C Rustomjee, ‘Pathways Through 
Financial Crisis: South Africa’ (2006) 12 Global Governance 431. 
6 See United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review South Africa A/HRC/8/32, 23 May 2008. See also J 
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these divisions roughly followed racial lines, with a relatively affluent white 
minority and a poor black mass populace. This continues to be the situation, 
despite the rise of a wealthy black middle class and concerted efforts by the 
state to redistribute wealth, access to land and mass education.  
In addition, after decades of inequality, deprivation and social upheaval due to 
violent resistance to the apartheid regime, many of the traditional familial and 
social values of native South Africans have fragmented, and educational 
levels have been poor to non-existent. The history of sanctioned violent 
resistance has led to a culture of general lawlessness. Indeed, South Africa has 
one of the highest violent crime rates in the world.7 Its murder rate is judged 
to be more than twice that of its immediate (and troubled) neighbour, 
Zimbabwe, more than three times that of Nigeria, almost twelve times that of 
the United States and 43 times the intentional homicide rate in the United 
Kingdom.8 Thus significant challenges remain in bridging the gap between 
the privileged and the impoverished and in ensuring the economic integration 
of the black majority.9
 
  
A  A Sink or Swim Situation 
 
In order to achieve socio-economic change to improve the lives of black 
South Africans and to integrate South Africa into a rapidly changing global 
environment, the government embarked on an ambitious (and continuing) 
legislative and social engineering exercise aimed at transforming society. Its 
priority is to achieve an equitable culture founded on respect for human rights, 
human development and enhancement of social, economic and cultural rights. 
To further this aim, it entered into a social contract with civil society, the 
corporate sector and organised labour in a public-private partnership to 
                                                                                                                    
Herbst, ‘Mbeki’s South Africa’ (2005) 84 Foreign Affairs 93; R Hamann, ‘Can business make 
decisive contributions to development? Towards a Research Agenda on Corporate Citizenship 
and Beyond’ (2005) 23 Development Southern Africa 175, 180. 
7  J Simpson South Africa faces crime challenge (2007) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6347717.stm> at 23 June 2009. 
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime International Homicide Statistics 2004 recorded 
the incidence of intentional homicide in South Africa in 2004 as 69 per 100 000 of the 
population, compared to 32.9 for its immediate neighbour Zimbabwe, 17.7 for Nigeria, 5.9 for 
the United States of America and 1.6 for the UK (England and Wales). 
9 South Africa: Economic Review (2008)  
<http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/econoverview.htm> at 23 June 2009. 
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generate the requisite domestic capital as well as to re-invigorate the economy 
to make this goal realisable.10
Indeed, the post apartheid era has seen the expanded role of the corporate 
sector in South Africa’s economic transformation. The operations of large 
conglomerates such as De Beers, Anglo American, Impala Platinum, Billiton, 
Eskom, Sasol and Mittal have contributed to the rapid growth of South 
Africa’s economy through long term investment and the provision of 
employment and other opportunities. Importantly for the purposes of this 
article, in envisaging a role for companies in meeting the country’s deep 
socio- economic challenges, the South African government ushered in an 
‘inclusive’ approach
 
11 to corporate governance in 1994.12
 
 
II THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: EMBRACING STAKEHOLDERS  
 
South Africa boasts a corporate governance regime comparable with most 
developed economies, with its own corporate regulations, a stock exchange 
(Johannesburg Securities Exchange), regulators and inspectorates, which 
include a Department of Trade and Industry, Registrar of Companies, 
Financial Services Board and the Institute of Directors. As in the UK, two 
regimes relating to the law of corporate governance exist: first, the legal 
regime (company legislation and common law) and, second, a system 
embodied in codes of practice.13
                                                 
10 UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, ‘Report for the Working Group on 
the Universal Periodic Review South Africa’ (2008) A/HRC/8/32. 
 The majority of South Africa’s private equity 
holders are foreign institutional investors, which bring considerable external 
influence to bear. In recent years, changes have been made to its corporate 
governance regime – including encouraging shareholder activism, stricter 
11 Namely that in managing the company, the responsibility of the board is not only toward its 
shareholders, but also toward its stakeholders, such as its employees, the environment and 
society at large.  
12 See I Esser, ‘The Enlightened-Shareholder-Value Approach Versus Pluralism in the 
Management of Companies’ (2005) 26 Obiter 719.; A West, ‘Theorising South Africa’s 
Corporate Governance’ (2006) 68 Journal of Business Ethics 433; I Esser and A Dekker, ‘The 
Dynamics in Corporate Governance in South Africa: Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment and the Enhancement of Good Corporate Governance Principles’ (2008) 3 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 157. 
13 See P C Aka, ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: Analysing the Dynamics of Corporate 
Governance Reforms in the ‘Rainbow Nation’’ (2007) 33 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 219, 243–4. 
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enforcement of takeover and merger procedures, revising the Companies Act, 
adopting internationally accepted accounting standards into law and 
strengthening the powers of regulators. It is submitted that the South African 
corporate governance regime mirrors closely that in Anglo American 
jurisdictions.14
A major influence on corporate governance in South Africa is the series of 
King Reports on Corporate Governance. The first, King I, was published in 
1994.
  
15 The Report set out the potential direction of corporate governance 
reform post apartheid. It incorporated a code of practice very much based on 
that in Britain, with an emphasis on shareholder protection and the duties of 
directors. However, it also diverged from this model by recommending 
stronger stakeholder engagement and consideration of the impact of the 
company’s activities on the wider community.16 King II, published in 2002,17 
took this ‘inclusive approach’ to a higher level.18 It emphasised the need for 
companies to recognise that they did not act independently of the societies in 
which they operated. 19 Although the primary duty of directors was to the 
company (essentially confirming the shareholder model), the interests of 
stakeholders, such as the community, customers, employees and suppliers, all 
needed to be considered when developing company strategy. King II 
advocated a move to the ‘triple bottom line’ to embrace the economic, 
environmental and social aspects of a company’s activities.20
                                                 
14 See A West, ‘The Ethics of Corporate Governance: A South African Perspective’ (2009) 51 
International Journal of Law and Management 10. 
 Thus, corporate 
15 See P Armstrong ‘The King Report on Corporate Governance’ (1995) 3 Juta’s Business Law 
65. 
16  King I was recognised internationally, when published, as the most comprehensive 
publication on the subject, embracing an inclusive approach to corporate governance. See 
<http://www.iodsa.co.za/king.asp#King%20I%20Report%20-%201994> at 23 June 2009. 
17  The Code is voluntary and not legally binding. However, the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange publishes a Social Responsibility Index which measures the triple bottom line of 
selected companies. Companies joining the Index will thus have a strong incentive to observe 
the Code. 
18 King II (The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002) [5] and [17], 
available from Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, e-mail: iodsa@iodsa.co.za, website: 
<http://www.iodsa.co.za>. The Executive Summary of the Report can be viewed at 
<http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ukznms/King-ReportExec-sum.pdf> at 13 July 2009. See also Aka, 
above n 13, 249–51.  
19 These provisions reflect the country’s determination to ensure that companies play a positive 
role in the country’s development. See S Andreasson, Understanding corporate governance 
reform in South Africa: Anglo-American divergence, the King Reports and hybridization (2009) 
Selected Works <http://works.bepress.com/stefan_andreasson/8> at 23 June 2009.  
20 ‘Triple bottom line’ is based on the premise that the performance of a company should 
extend beyond financial considerations to include those of society and the environment. The 
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governance should extend to the non-financial aspects of the company’s 
operations such as the promotion of black empowerment, the environment and 
society at large.21
King II pointed out that companies were likely to experience indirect benefits 
if they took social factors into consideration, given that the majority of South 
Africa’s citizens ‘remain[ed] on the fringes of society’s economic benefits’.
  
22 
Indeed, an exclusion of stakeholders would run counter to the traditional 
African values of co-existence, collectiveness and consensus.23
Companies don’t operate in a vacuum… Every company, large and small, 
has contractual and non-contractual relationships with individuals and 
entities. These might include the community in which the company 
operates, its customers, employees, shareowners and suppliers. In order for 
the inclusive approach to be implemented these stakeholder groups need to 
be defined and recognized by the company, and then the values by which 
the company will carry out its daily transactions with these stakeholders 
must be identified and communicated. This is not a one-way street, by 
contrast, the only way the company can achieve its goals is to ensure that it 
has mutually beneficial relationships with its stakeholders. 
Communication on performance, targets and commitments is the key to 
building trust. In my own experience, this inclusive approach is the way to 
create sustained business success and steady, long-term growth in 
shareowner value.
 
24
Importantly, King II envisaged that companies would carry out their 
responsibility to their stakeholders by informing stakeholders of company 
performance in a voluntary report (‘triple bottom line’ reporting). This 
reporting should be carried out in a clear, transparent and open manner.
 
25
                                                                                                                    
argument is that, as companies used social and environmental resources, they should report on 
returns on investment to society and the environment. 
 
21 This ‘inclusive’ approach is not new. On the contrary, it has been promoted by global bodies 
such as the WTO, UN (UN Global Impact, UN Global Reporting Initiative), World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and charities such as OXFAM. This same 
approach was adopted by the UK in its recent company law reform process, now embodied in 
the new Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 172.  
22 Executive Summary of the King II Report, above n 18, [36]. 
23 Executive Summary of the King II Report, ibid [38]. 
24 A Slater, ‘What you had was good – gems from a governance guru’ (2005) 2 Corporate 
Responsibility Management 1. 
25 Companies may base their reporting on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines 
which recommend the inclusion of specific information related to environmental, social and 
economic performance and help companies define the content and quality of their reports. The 
Guidelines were the result of collaboration by representatives from a broad range of 
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Reporting should cover the company’s social and environmental 
responsibilities. 26
There’s some suggestion that certain aspects of the recommendations in 
King II should be legislated – in other words, be compulsory for all 
companies. Business is a difficult matter, and those who run it can't have the 
prescience to envisage what is going to happen from day to day, so they need 
flexibility in the processes associated with administering their companies. To 
have the rigidity of a statute doesn't make business sense.
 King II did not, however, favour a legislative regime to 
force companies to comply with its recommendations, preferring, instead, self 
regulation. King said:  
27
 
 
A  King III (Inclusive Approach and Triple Bottom Line 
Reporting) 
 
The ‘inclusive approach’ in King II was recently endorsed in King III 
(February 2009) and in the new Companies Act 2008. King III (consisting of a 
draft Report and Code for Corporate Governance) was released on 25 
February 2009.28
 
 It renewed its call to businesses to focus on more than just 
the economic value of their activities, asking them also to take into account 
their social and environmental performance.  
King III will, when it comes into effect, apply to all entities, big and small, 
public and private, 29
                                                                                                                    
stakeholders from all over the world. See, for the Guidelines, 
<
 although it is mandatory for companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) to comply with it. Companies are 
encouraged to adapt the principles under the Code as appropriate to the size, 
nature and complexity of their businesses. King III follows an ‘apply or 
explain’ approach to governance – that is to say, where companies have 
applied the Code and best practice recommendations, they must state this 
positively to their stakeholders. Where a specific principle or recommendation 
has not been applied, the board must explain the reasons for this. This will 
http://www.globalreporting.org/Home> at 23 June 2009. 
26  Thus triple bottom line reporting applies accounting concepts to ‘corporate social 
responsibility’. 
27 M Barrier, ‘Principles, not rules: Thanks to Codes drafted under Mervyn King, South Africa 
has taken the lead in defining corporate governance in broadly inclusive terms’ – Interview, 
2003, Business Services Industry  
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_4_60/ai_106863373/pg_3?tag=content;col1> at 
23 June 2009.  
28 King III (Draft Report and Draft Code) (2009) Institute of Directors  
<http://www.iodsa.co.za/> at 23 June 2009. 
29 King II applied only to listed companies. 
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allow stakeholders to comment on and challenge the board to improve the 
standard of governance. In emphasising the necessity of an ‘inclusive’ 
approach to corporate governance, King III focuses extensively on the 
following tenets – ‘sustainability’ ‘corporate citizenship’ ‘social 
responsibility’ and ‘stakeholder relationships’, reflecting the recent emergence 
of these concepts to signify a new role for business in society. 
 
1  ‘Corporate citizenship’  
Chapter 2 of King III provides that the board has a responsibility to see that 
the company acts as, and is seen to be, a ‘responsible corporate citizen’ 
(Principle 2.1). The board is not only responsible for the company’s financial 
bottom line, but for the company’s performance in respect of its ‘triple bottom 
line’. King III asserts that a good corporate citizen is one which has 
comprehensive policies and practices in place which enable it to make 
decisions and conduct its operations ethically, meet legal requirements and 
show consideration for society, communities and the environment (Principle 
2.2). Directors must demonstrate effective and responsible leadership to 
ensure that the company is run in an ethical, transparent and accountable 
manner (Principle 2.3). Last but not least, the board has a responsibility to 
sustain and create an ethical corporate culture within the company (Principle 
2.4).  
2 ‘Integrated sustainability’ reporting (‘triple bottom line’ 
reporting)  
Chapter 6 encourages proactive and transparent communication and 
engagement with stakeholders on all material matters affecting the company 
(Principle 6.1). Reporting must be integrated across all areas of performance – 
including social and environmental performance. The board should report 
forward-looking information that will enable stakeholders to understand key 
issues affecting the company as well as the effect of its operation on the 
economic, social and environmental well being of the community (Principle 
6.2). But this means more than simply collating and adding on economic, 
social and environmental information; sustainability reporting should be 
integrated with other aspects of the business process and managed throughout 
the year (Principle 6.4). Companies are encouraged to draw on international 
and local guidance materials in their sustainability reporting (Principle 6.3).30
                                                 
30 These include the GRI (Global Reporting Initiatives) guidelines, AA1000 (AccountAbility 
1000) framework and stakeholder engagement standards, OHSAS (Occupational Health and 
Safety Standards) 18000 and 18001, ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) 9000 
quality management assurance standards and ISO 14000 environmental standards.  
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Finally, there should be an external assurance provider to provide assurance 
over the accuracy and completeness of sustainability reporting to stakeholders 
(Principle 6.5).  
3 ‘Stakeholder Relations’ 
Renewed commitment is given in King III to the management of stakeholder 
relations. Chapter 8 provides that the board should take account of the 
legitimate interests of stakeholders in its decisions and should proactively 
manage the relationships with its stakeholders (Principle 8.1). King III 
proposes that companies should consider not only formal processes of 
communication with their stakeholders (annual general meetings and liaison 
with union representatives). They should also consider informal methods of 
communication, such as direct contact, websites, advertising, or press releases 
(Principle 8.2). Companies should strive to achieve the correct balance 
between stakeholder groupings. King III provides that board decisions as to 
how to balance interests of stakeholders should be guided by the aim of 
ultimately advancing the best interests of the company (Principle 8.4). This 
applies equally to the achievement of the ‘triple bottom line’ and the whole 
notion of good corporate citizenship as described in Chapter 2. Although the 
company has the primary duty to manage the relationships with its 
stakeholders, the stakeholders are expected to co-operate with the company in 
order to facilitate the process. They therefore need to consider, before acting 
solely in their own interests, the implications of their actions for the other 
stakeholders. Ultimately, not taking account of the interests of other 
stakeholders may result in damage to the company and its long term 
sustainability. Stakeholders should consider whether, and if so how, to give 
active support to a company’s corporate governance initiatives (Principle 8.4).  
The expectation that companies will take their responsibilities to stakeholders 
seriously goes hand in hand with recent South African legislation promoting 
corporate citizenship,31
                                                 
31 See the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003, Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 2002, National Environmental Management Act 1998, 
Employment Equity Act 1998, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act 2000 and Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004. See W Visser, 
‘Corporate Citizenship in South Africa: A Review of Progress since Democracy’ (2005) 18 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 29, 31. 
 increasing pressure from stakeholder groups and the 
promulgation of various initiatives in this area on the international front, most 
notably the Global Reporting Initiative. Various Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) funds now exist, which track companies’ social, ethical and 
environmental performance in South Africa. In May 2004, the JSE launched 
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its own tradeable SRI index, the first of its kind in an emerging economy 
based on the ‘triple bottom line’ approach.32 To be included in the Index, 
companies must prove their governance standards, environmental policies, 
health and safety records and policies relating to HIV/AIDS, and show how 
they have supported black economic empowerment. 33
Anglo American – ‘Today, sustainable development is embedded in our 
policies, strategies and everyday practices. We now assess the economic, 
social and environmental risks and benefits of every decision.
 Many companies in 
South Africa today claim their commitment to improving their ‘triple bottom 
line’ performance, as evidenced below: 
34
BHP Billiton – ‘Sustainable Development at BHP Billiton encompasses our 
commitment and policy towards health, safety, the environment and the 
community (HSEC). To ensure improved performance, we have set specific 
targets in these areas.’
 
35
Mondi – ‘The Code of Business Ethics applies to all Mondi employees. It 
comprises five principles: 
 
Legal compliance: Mondi will comply with all applicable laws and 
regulations.  
Honesty and integrity: Mondi will observe the highest standards of 
honesty and integrity.  
Human rights: Mondi will respect the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  
Stakeholders: Mondi will have due regard to the interests of its 
stakeholders – shareholders, employees, customers, business 
partners and communities.  
Sustainability: Mondi will conduct its business sustainably, 
ensuring safety, health and the protection of the environment.’36
SABMiller – ‘South Africa's biggest killer, HIV/Aids has left many children 
orphaned and vulnerable. SAB Ltd is working with The StarFish Foundation 
 
                                                 
32 See, for more information, <http://www.jse.co.za/sri/> at 10 August 2009. The Index lists the 
constituent companies, which number approximately 60 today. It launched with 51 companies 
in 2004. See also Visser, above n 31, 35-6. 
33 See M Vaughn and L R Ryan, ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: A Bellwether for the 
Continent’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An International Review 504, 507.  
34 See Anglo American ‘Sustainable Development’  
<http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/aa/development/> at 13 July 2009. 
35 See BHP Billiton ‘Sustainable Development’ 
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/sustainableDevelopment.jsp> at 13 July 2009. 
36 See Mondi ‘Business Ethics’  
<http://www.mondigroup.com/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-1366> at 13 July 2009. 
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in nine organisations that care for adults and orphans affected by 
HIV/Aids… The work seeks to give local people the knowledge and 
expertise to run these organisations effectively. Ultimately, the aim is to 
develop a large number of stable and well-run community-based 
organisations that are capable of working with the government to deliver 
care, resources and services to children orphaned by the pandemic. By 
training 117 caregivers and funding nine such organisations to take part in 
the programme for 18 months, SAB Ltd will benefit an estimated 2,700 
children.’37
De Beers – ‘HIV/AIDS management in Southern Africa is embedded into 
the workings of our business and is a key part of our business risk 
management process... [Anti-retroviral treatment] is available free to HIV 
infected employees and their spouse or life partners where it can be provided 
in a responsible and sustainable manner.’
 
38
 
 
B  Companies Act 2008 
 
The recent reform of company law in South Africa (outlined in South African 
Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform 
2004) 39
 
 set out the basis for a redraft of the Companies Act 1973. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) formulated a new approach to 
corporate governance to replace the old model which was focused on 
shareholders:  
[A] company should have as its objective the conduct of business activities 
with a view to enhancing the economic success of the corporation, taking 
into account, as appropriate, the legitimate interests of other stakeholder 
constituencies.40
It endorsed the approach taken in King I and II that the company is a social as 
well as an economic institution and, accordingly, its pursuit of economic 
 
                                                 
37  See SAB Miller ‘Caring for Children affected by HIV/AIDS in South Africa’ 
<http://www.sabmiller.com/index.asp?pageid=960&year=2008> at 13 July 2009. 
38 See De Beers ‘HIV/AIDS’  
<http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/Sustainability/Employees/HIVAIDS/> at 13 July 2009. 
39  <http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/01326_notice1183. 
pdf> at 23 June 2009.  
40  Ibid 24–5. This is essentially the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach in the UK 
(discussed further below). The review of the new UK Company law spanned over 8 years, 
starting in 1998. This undoubtedly had an influence on the review process in South Africa.  
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objectives should be constrained by social and environmental imperatives. 
The new Act provides:  
Standards of directors’ conduct 
76(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when 
acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions 
of director— 
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the company; and 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be 
expected of a person— 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.41
The new Act does not legislate on the precise content of the above duty, rather 
it leaves the position to be dealt with in accordance with the ‘inclusive’ 
approach. The courts thus have the opportunity to delineate the ambit of 
section 76 through the development of common law. The Companies Act was 
approved by Parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). It is 
intended that the Act will be effective in 2010. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Traditionally, directors must exercise their powers ‘for the benefit of the company as a 
whole’. This is synonymous with the interests of the body of shareholders but not those of 
stakeholders. The reform process saw a move away from the traditional shareholder model 
towards an ‘enlightened shareholder value’ concept, very much reflecting developments in the 
UK in this area at that time. The new approach would require directors to take into account, 
where appropriate, the needs of various stakeholders, although shareholders’ interests would 
remain paramount. There is evidence that courts in South Africa are already moving in this 
direction. See Minister of Water and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining 2006 (5) SA 333 (W), 
where company directors had refused to comply with an order from the Ministry to drain water 
from a mine on health and safety grounds, arguing that it was not possible for the company to 
comply with the directives and still remain financially viable. The court judged that their 
conduct flew in the face of what was recommended in the code of corporate practices and 
conduct recommended by the King Committee when the South African corporate community 
had, widely and uniformly, endorsed their findings and recommendations. The King Committee 
had all along stressed that one of the characteristics of good corporate governance was social 
responsibility. The directors in the case were ordered to comply with the order. See 
Vennnemeth and Hart Attorneys, ‘Law Letter, February 2007’ 
<http://www.vnh.co.za/docs/law_letter_feb_2007.pdf> at 13 July 2009. 
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III ‘TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE’ REPORTING  
 
The need for companies in South Africa to adopt an ‘inclusive’ approach has 
generated much discussion. Many academics have argued that such an 
approach is compatible with traditional African values (community, 
consensus, obligation and cooperation), that it is fundamental to long term 
corporate success and that it would enable companies to meet socio-economic 
challenges within South Africa.42
 
  
The Anglo-American model is never going to sit entirely comfortably with 
the political demands and pressures that South African society generates and 
notions of the African approach. South Africa is therefore a good test case 
for assessing the viability and potential of a hybrid model that is able to 
reconcile the competing demands of shareholder and stakeholders models in 
a cultural context that is different from that in which they originally 
developed...43
Global and local attention on sustainability issues is clearly growing. 
Because the company is so integral to society, it is considered as much of a 
citizen of a country as is a natural person who has citizenship. It is expected 
that the company will be directed to be and be seen to be a decent citizen. 
This involves social, environmental and economic issues – the ‘triple bottom 
line’. Boards should no longer make decisions based only on the needs of the 
present because this may compromise the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs… The success of companies in the 21st Century is 
bound up with three interdependent sub-systems – the natural environment, 
the social and political system and the global economy. Global companies 
play a role in all three and they need all three to flourish… In short, planet, 
people and profit are inextricably intertwined.
 
44
How is this ‘inclusive’ approach to be proven? The answer is that company 
directors must expand their traditional reporting framework to take into 
account not only their financial, but also social and environmental 
performance, the so-called ‘triple bottom line reporting’ (Principle 6.1, King 
III – ‘Reporting should be integrated across all areas of performance, 
reflecting the choices made in the strategic decisions adopted by the board, 
and should include reporting on economic, social and environmental 
 
                                                 
42 See West, above n 12 and Andreasson, above n 19. See also G J Rossouw, A van der Watt 
and D P Malan, ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa’ (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 
289–302; G J Rossouw, ‘Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa’ (2005) 44 
Business and Society 94. 
43 Andreasson, above n 19. 
44 King III, above n 28, 15. 
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issues’). 45 The overall fulfilment by companies of their obligations (ie the 
‘inclusive approach’) to the environment, employees and society at large 
should be measured, calculated, audited and reported, just as their financial 
performance is. 46  Importantly, triple bottom line reporting informs 
stakeholders about the intentions of the company to enhance its social 
performance, emphasises its positive actions, signifies its respect for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and demonstrates the legitimacy of the 
company in the eyes of stakeholders. 47  Triple bottom line reporting is 
regarded as a contemporary and exciting notion and has been embraced by 
stakeholder organisations, ‘ethical’ investment funds, accounting firms as well 
as multinationals all over the world, with the term itself spreading ‘like wild 
fire’.48
Companies have demonstrated a great willingness to prove their 
responsibilities to society in their disclosure practices. The reporting practices 
of the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE on policies relating to the 
environment, community, promotion of black economic empowerment, 
employee relations and human rights were investigated recently.
  
49  It was 
found that the frequency and level of such reporting was significantly higher 
than that of companies in the leading economies. The same reporting by 
companies in the more developed countries tended to concentrate only on 
shareholder, rather than stakeholder, concerns. It has been shown that South 
Africa is catching up on environmental, social and governance issues, and 
reporting on these issues is more developed than commonly expected and 
often exceeded standards in high income countries.50
But does triple bottom line reporting actually deliver? Are its benefits felt ‘on 
the ground’ where it matters? Quite apart from the criticism that it is far from 
clear what the concept actually means, ‘triple bottom line’ reporting cannot be 
 
                                                 
45 King III does not use the words ‘triple bottom line’ reporting, using instead ‘integrated 
sustainability reporting’. However both kinds of reporting refer to the same issues, namely 
economic, social and environmental performance.  
46 W Norman and C MacDonald, ‘Getting to the Bottom of TBL (2004) 14 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 243. 
47 See C Dawkins and F W Ngunjiri, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting In South 
Africa: A Descriptive and Comparative Analysis’ (2008) 45 Journal of Business 
Communication 286, 288–9. 
48 Norman and McDonald, above n 46, 244.  
49 See Dawkins and Ngunjiri, above n 47. 
50  See J Baskin, ‘Corporate Responsibility in Emerging Markets’ (2006) 24 Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship 29. See also SIRAN, Social Investment Forum and EIRIS, A Review of 
ESG Practices I Large Emerging Market Companies <2009>, 31, 
<http://www.siran.org/pdfs/Emerging%20Markets%20Paper%20_%20FINAL.pdf> at 23 June 
2009. 
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measured or aggregated. In the absence of an (as yet) agreed upon 
methodology, it is near impossible to quantify a company’s social or 
environmental performance in a way which reduces them to some kind of 
bottom-line result. 51
 (a) it is increasing the proportion of black employees by 5%, 
 For example, how does one interpret the following 
information in the annual report of a company?  
 (b) it has cut down emissions by 10%, 
 (c) it directed 22% of its budget to community-based programs, 
 (d) 175 workers participated in its training programs, and 
 (e) it invested R1.5 million into R&D addressing HIV/AIDS 
Does the information prove that the company’s social and environmental 
bottom lines are improved. Have stakeholder concerns been met? Aggregated 
together, what does it all mean? The problem is that any answers to these 
questions can only be subjective, reflecting the personal values of the person 
judging them, rather than those of the stakeholders. 52 It is not possible to 
measure the benefits to the society and environment in monetary terms, as 
there is with financial profit, there being no social or environmental 
equivalents to revenue, expenses, losses, assets and liabilities.53
Triple bottom line reporting also offers companies few means of prioritising 
the requirements of different stakeholders. How should the board trade the 
interests of one group of stakeholders off against another, when their needs 
conflict? Integrating and coordinating the diverse yet interrelated needs of 
stakeholders into company policy is necessarily a subjective exercise. The 
board may thus be exposed to litigation by stakeholders who perceive that 
their interests have not been taken into consideration. Ultimately, requiring 
the board to balance the interests of various stakeholders against each other 
may cause it to lose focus and pursue inconsistent objectives. If so, the overall 
outcome is likely to be inefficiency, raising company costs.
 
54
                                                 
51 See Norman and MacDonald, above n 46, 249–251. 
 More cynically, 
52 R Price, What Triple Bottom Line?: Actually, It’s All Social <http://www.kiri-
ganai.com.au/attachments/publications/What%20Triple%20Bottom%20Line%20-
%20It%27s%20all%20Social.pdf> at 23 June 2009. 
53 See F Robins, ‘The Challenge of TBL: A Responsibility to Whom?’ (2006) Business and 
Society Review 1; Norman and MacDonald, above n 46, 250. 
54 Robins, above n 53, 7. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                              VOLUME 14 NO 1 
 
 
 
68 
68 
it has been argued that ‘triple bottom line’ reporting allows companies to 
make vague commitments to social and environmental concerns. As there is 
no real social or environmental bottom line to measure their performance 
against, companies do not have to worry about being compared to others in 
the same industry or about whether their social and environmental bottom 
lines have declined over the years.55
Even if triple bottom line reporting can be ‘a vital source of moral 
resuscitation in business life’, it is still dependent for its success on 
stakeholder engagement, organisational integrity and stakeholder activism.
  
56 
These criteria are built on the assumption that stakeholders have adequate 
resources and experience to enter into dialogue with companies, that there is 
an active stakeholder culture in society and that companies are willing to work 
with stakeholders to find an optimal solution. In an emerging economy such 
as South Africa’s, the existence of these conditions cannot necessarily be 
taken for granted.57 Indeed, a recent study of a major HIV/AIDS initiative by 
Anglo-American plc in South Africa shows the vital importance of external 
international agencies.58
What does the experience in South Africa show so far? An answer can be 
gleaned from the performance by companies in the SRI Index. As noted 
above, membership of the Index is dependent on companies’ performance of 
their triple bottom line obligations, as periodically evaluated. The results of 
the first two rounds of evaluations suggested that companies participating in 
the assessment process merely described their sustainability process in an 
‘aspirational and anecdotal manner’ and ‘in a general, rather than objective 
and direct manner’.
  
59  Also, their commitment to communication with 
shareholders and investors was more thoroughly acted upon than their 
commitment to stakeholder relations. Some firms scored themselves highly 
despite their poor commitment to stakeholder issues.60 Few companies have 
committed themselves to achieving specific targets or reporting their 
performance against these targets. The Index is also poorly monitored. 61
                                                 
55 See Norman and McDonald, above n 46, 256. 
 
There is little comparative or quantitative information and only few reports 
56 See M Painter-Morland, ‘TBL Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating CSR and Corporate 
Codes of Conduct’ (2006) 15 Business Ethics: A European Review 352.  
57  See Hamann, 2006, above n 6, 190 
58 See R Croucher and E Cotton, Global Unions, Global Business (2009).  
59 See D Sonnenberg and R Hamann ‘The JSE Socially Responsible Investment Index and the 
State of Sustainability Reporting in South Africa’ (2006) 23 Development Southern Africa 305. 
60 See P Bond, ‘Social Movements and CSR in South Africa’ (2008) 39 Development and 
Change 1037, 1038.  
61 See Bond, above n 60, 1038. 
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have included independent, third party verification of company activities. 
Further, company reports are often presented in a manner which stakeholders 
do not understand, even if they read them. In addition, the KPMG 
International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2008 shows that, 
although 86% of companies in South Africa included some level of 
sustainability reporting (whether stand alone or incorporated into their annual 
reports), only 15% sought an audit of their reports.62 This may be because of 
the low demand for auditing from stakeholders and a general lack of 
awareness among companies about the benefits of an audit. The Report also 
pointed out that, although many companies based their reports against the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) indicators, they provided very little 
information on sustainability strategies, context or material issues.63
 
 
A  Developments in the UK: How Much Reporting is 
Good Reporting?  
 
It is noteworthy that similar developments with regard to directors’ duties and 
their reporting obligations took place in the UK not long ago. In its review of 
its company law regime (1998 – 2005) - the so-called Operating and Financial 
Review - the UK considered requiring companies to produce comprehensive 
reports to inform not only shareholders, but also stakeholders of the 
performance and development of the business of the company. In recognition 
of the unique environment in which companies operate today, it was judged 
that directors should consider a variety of stakeholder interests and view high 
shareholder returns as the result of running a successful enterprise, rather than 
as an end to be pursued in its own right. This marked a shift away from the 
traditional shareholder-oriented approach; now, it was regarded that the 
promotion of the success of the company could not effectively be achieved by 
trampling on the interests of other stakeholders whose contributions were 
necessary for the success of the company.64
                                                 
62 The Report can be viewed at  
 Section 172 Companies Act 2006 
thus introduced a modified version of directors’ duties – the ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ or ‘inclusive’ approach - obliging directors to take into 
account, where circumstances so required, the interests of stakeholders when 
considering what would best promote the success of the company.  
<http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/International-corporate-responsibility-
survey-2008_v2.pdf> at 13 July 2009. 
63 Ibid 93–4. 
64 See G Vinten, ‘Shareholder vs Stakeholder: Is There a Governance Dilemma?’ (2001) 9 
Corporate Governance 36; and L Roach, ‘The Legal Model of the Company and the CLR’ 
(2005) 26 The Company Lawyer 98, 99–101. Note also that the UK introduced, for the first 
time, a Minister for CSR in 2000. 
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Hand in hand with this modified duty was the duty to report on matters which 
would be of use to stakeholders, such as the environment, the company’s 
employees, social and community issues, persons with whom the company 
has contractual or other arrangements which are essential to the business, and 
receipts from, and returns to, members of the company in respect of shares 
held by them. This was a clear acknowledgement that stakeholders, such as 
employees, customers and the community, had a legitimate interest in the 
activities of the company and should therefore also have access to company 
information. Regulations to put this formal and comprehensive reporting 
regime on a statutory footing were introduced to take effect 1 April 2005.65 To 
the surprise of many, however, and despite all the work done to introduce the 
obligation to produce a mandatory Operating and Financial Review (OFR), in 
November 2005 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown MP, 
announced that the government was abandoning the decision to oblige 
companies to produce an OFR and would instead substitute a much simpler, 
less comprehensive and less forward-looking reporting regime.66 The reasons 
given for this U-turn, which angered many stakeholder representatives,67 were 
the reduction of costs, the removal of red tape and the relieving of companies 
from what would be a considerable administrative burden. The OFR 
Regulations were repealed in January 2006 and replaced by a simplified 
regime (now found in section 417 of the Companies Act 2006). Although 
companies must still engage in reporting to stakeholders, they are now subject 
to a much less detailed and much less prescriptive regime compared to that 
under the original OFR.68
What are the implications of the English experience for South Africa, whose 
recent developments have so clearly mirrored those in the UK? First, in 
relation to the reporting duties of directors, it is perhaps difficult to ignore the 
reluctance on the part of the UK government to create significant cost and 
 
                                                 
65 Companies Act 1985 Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report etc Regulations 
2005 (Statutory Instrument 2005 No 1011) <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20051011.htm> 
at 13 July 2009.  
66 28 November 2005, Speech by the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the CBI Annual Conference in London, <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_99_05.htm> at 13 July 2009.  
67 B Hall, ‘Brown to Scrap Reporting Rule; Chancellor in U-turn on OFR; Move Aims to Mend 
Fences with Business; CBI Welcomes Decision’, Financial Times, 28 November 2005, 1; M 
Milner, ‘Friends of the Earth Seek U Turn on End of Business Review’, The Guardian, 12 
January 2006. 
68 The debate surrounding the OFR is extensively dealt with in A Schall, L Miles, and S 
Goulding, ‘Promoting an Inclusive Approach on the Part of Directors: the UK and German 
Positions’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 299. Readers might also be interested in 
developments in this area in Germany, which is also discussed. 
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regulatory burdens for companies by imposing on them detailed, 
comprehensive and prescriptive reporting obligations. A fair balance must be 
struck between the extent to which companies are to engage in reporting and 
the usefulness of this reporting to stakeholders. But how much reporting is 
good reporting? This is by no means an easy question to resolve. The U-turn 
on the part of the UK government was criticised for undermining the 
significant preparation taken by companies to prepare for more robust levels 
of reporting and for eroding potential relations with stakeholders. It was also 
argued that backing down at the last minute would only lead to further 
uncertainty, risks of non-compliance by companies and a blasé attitude toward 
stakeholders.69
 
 South African regulators will no doubt now need to determine 
the extent of reporting that companies have to produce. The companies must 
avoid the danger of viewing reporting obligations in isolation and as ends in 
themselves. The dominant question is how the obligations can dovetail 
effectively with the wider duty of directors to be more receptive to the 
interests of stakeholders. All in all, the English experience perhaps shows that 
this is not an easy task to undertake. 
B  Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Current movements toward an ‘inclusive approach’ to directors’ duties, triple 
bottom line reporting and ‘corporate citizenship’ in South Africa cannot be 
divorced from the ongoing discussion in the literature and business circles of 
the corporate social responsibility of companies. Ultimately, the current 
intention of policy makers in South Africa is to encourage companies to 
recognise and give effect to their corporate social responsibilities. However 
one labels it – ‘triple bottom line’, ‘inclusive approach’ or ‘corporate 
citizenship’ – the intention is to link business with wider societal concerns. 
Many now argue that CSR issues are making their way onto the corporate 
governance agenda, as the boundaries and definition of corporate governance 
change and evolve in today’s environment. This is reflected in the 
development of formal governance structures incorporating CSR issues, such 
as CSR reports and CSR committees. Companies demonstrating good 
governance are also expected by the public to show the extent of their 
corporate citizenship. 70
                                                 
69  ‘OFR Letter to Alan Johnson’ January 2006, SustainAbility, 
<
 In the light of this, the present part of this article 
http://www.sustainability.com/downloads_public/news/OFR_PR.pdf> at 13 July 2009.  
70  C Strandberg, ‘The Convergence of Corporate Governance and CSR’ (2005) 1 
<http://www.corostrandberg.com/pdfs/Corporate_Governance.pdf> at 24 June 2009; R Bird, A 
Hall, F Momentè and F Reggiani, ‘What CSR Activities are Valued by the Market?’ (2007) 76 
Journal of Business Ethics 2, 189; K Money and H Schepers, ‘Are CSR and Corporate 
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investigates the following question – to what extent does CSR deliver, 
especially in the context of a developing economy?  
 
CSR can be defined in the following way: 
Corporate social responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to 
behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving 
the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local 
community and society at large.71
That there is an increasing recognition that companies have social 
responsibilities that go beyond maximising profits for shareholders is now 
undeniable.
  
72 In South Africa, this recognition is evident in all three King 
reports and in the new Companies Act 2008. Many claim that it is profitable 
for a company to behave well.73 Companies which take their responsibility to 
stakeholders seriously attract respect for their products and services as well as 
customer loyalty. Such companies can also persuade governments that they 
are taking issues such as the environment, their employees and the welfare of 
their community seriously and so avoid legal regulation. A good reputation 
enables companies to recruit employees who stay longer, thus reducing 
recruitment and retraining costs. Finally, understanding the wider impact of 
their businesses enables companies to think about profitable new products and 
services.74
                                                                                                                    
Governance Converging?’ (2007) 33 Journal of General Management, 1; A Kolk and J Pinkse, 
‘The Integration of Corporate Governance in Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures’ 
(2009)  
  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350939> at 24 June 2009; A Gill, ‘Corporate Governance as Social 
Responsibility: A Research Agenda’ (2008) 26 Berkeley Journal of International Law 452. 
71  R Holme and P Watts, Corporate Social Responsibility: Making Good Business Sense 
(World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2000) 6 
<http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/csr2000.pdf> at 16 July, 2009. 
72 See P Lund Thomsen, ‘Corporate Accountability in South Africa: The Role of Community 
Mobilising in Environmental governance’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 3, 619.  
73  The same position is taken by international bodies – see the UN Global Compact at 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org> at 24 June 2009; World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development  
<http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=NjA> at 24 
June 2009 and International Organisation for Standardisation at 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm> at 24 June 2009; World Trade Organisation, ILO and 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies. 
74  See <http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?type=RESOURCES&itemId= 
1075408491>. The link between CC or CSR and profit, however, is not necessarily obvious. 
See G Balabanis, H C Phillips and J Lyall, ‘CSR and economic performance in the top British 
companies: are they linked?’ (1998) 98 European Business Review 25; R K Mittal, N Sinha and 
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A wealth of literature has emerged discussing the potential of CSR to improve 
the welfare of company stakeholders in developing economies (including 
South Africa). However, the literature also shows that there is often a 
discrepancy between what companies promise to do and what they actually 
do.75 In the context of South Africa, the literature demonstrates that measures 
to provide HIV/AIDS support, for example, have been uneven, slow and 
selective, necessitating formal regulation so as to achieve targets. 76 
Companies have continued to pollute the environment despite coercion by the 
state and lobby groups to adopt more stringent environmental management 
systems. Where the state has introduced legislation to penalise companies 
which fail to limit pollution, success has been limited by poor enforcement. 
Even worse, enforcement authorities have been reluctant to prosecute 
offending companies for fear that strict enforcement may lead to job losses 
and disinvestment. 77
                                                                                                                    
A Singh, ‘An analysis of linkage between economic value added and CSR’(2008) 46 
Management Decision 1437; C Thomsen and J Lauring, ‘Practising the Business of CSR” 
(2008) 4 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 117; D J Vogel, ‘Is there a 
Market for Virtue? The Business Case for CSR’ (2005) 47 California Management Review 19; 
A McWilliams and D Siegal, ‘CSR and Financial Performance: Correlation or 
Misspecification?’ (2000) 21 Strategic Management Journal 603.  
 Recent research also suggests that, in the context of 
mining companies (a significant industry in South Africa), CSR action is 
selective; issues with an economic impact, such as HIV/AIDS, tend to be 
given priority, whereas those related to black empowerment, the environment, 
75 See Lund-Thomsen, above n 72, 621–2; D Fig, ‘Manufacturing Amnesia: Corporate Social 
Responsibility in South Africa’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 599; 
A Pendleton, ‘The Real Face of CSR’ (2004) Consumer Policy Review at 
<http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/laws-government-regulations-environmental/946545-
1.html> at 24 June 2009. 
76 See Fig, 2005, above n 75, 616; D Dickinson, ‘Corporate South Africa's response to 
HIV/AIDS: Why so slow?’ (2004) 30 Journal of Southern African Studies 627; D Dickinson and 
M Stevens, ‘Understanding the Response of large South African companies to HIV/AIDS’ 
(2005) Journal of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS 286; R Hamann and C Schild, ‘Business and 
Human Rights in South Africa’ (2008) National Business Initiative 1 
<http://www.nbi.org.za/__documents/S_A/businesshumanrights-webversion.pdf> at 24 June 
2009; AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa ‘The Mining Sector, Tuberculosis and 
Migrant Labour in Southern Africa’, July 2008, 1–19 
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/3998598/Mines-TB-and-Southern-Africa> at 13 July 2009; M 
Curtis, ‘Fanning the Flames: The Role of British Mining Companies in Conflict and the 
Violation of Human Rights’ November 2007 1–40 
<http://www.waronwant.org/attachments/Fanning%20the%20Flames.pdf> at 13 July 2009; G 
Frynas, ‘The False Developmental Promise of CSR: Evidence from Multinational Oil 
Companies’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 581 and S Dhanarajan, ‘Managing Ethical 
Standards: When Rhetoric meets Reality’ (2005) 15 Development in Practice 529. 
77 See Fig, above n 74, 603. 
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education and training receive less attention.78 Experience shows that it is 
more realistic to stop perceiving a link between companies and social welfare 
and concentrate instead on establishing a state which is run by a political party 
with genuine accountability to the poor and demonstrating environmental, 
gender and race consciousness.79 Indeed, civil society groups may be a more 
durable force in aligning the interests of companies with that of society, as 
opposed to companies themselves. There have been many instances where the 
community, civil society groups and campaigners have achieved direct results 
for society by challenging the actions of companies which profess their 
commitment to CSR, whether through lobbying, litigation or campaigning.80 
Although not in the South African context, the efforts of civil society groups 
against the actions of Aracruz Celulose SA (Brazil’s largest pulp and paper 
manufacturer) provide another demonstration of the potential value of civil 
society groups.81
Secondly, the desire to be competitive, attract investment and prosper 
economically often leads the state to liberalise laws to attract foreign 
investors. The investors come into conflict with local communities. Company 
activity degrades the environment, increases pollution and displaces whole 
communities. In the context of a developing country, the ability of NGOs, 
grass roots and civil society organisations to challenge company actions is 
often hampered by a lack of experience and resources, a lack of legal literacy, 
a distrust of legal processes and intimidation by the authorities.
  
82
                                                 
78 S Viviers and JM Boudler, ‘CSR in the Mining Sector: Critical Issues’ (2008), 1-23, 
<
 It is also the 
case that, in developing countries, the poor and marginalised do not have a 
strong voice and are not represented. Thus the connection between issues 
which companies recognise they can/must address and the expectations of 
stakeholders are not necessarily clear. In any case, defining ‘favourable 
impact’, ‘good performance’ and ‘sustainable effect’ is subjective and does 
http://www.isbee.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=221&Itemi
d=39> at 13 July 2009 
79 See Bond, above n 60, 1038. 
80 For example, the Treatment Action Campaign, an HIV/AIDS pressure group, succeeded in 
forcing the government to extend its anti-retroviral treatment programme to inmates in prisons 
in 2006 as a result of a successful suit in the High Court in Durban (Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others KZN4576/06). 
See also Lund-Thomsen, 2005, above n 72 and Fig, 2005, above n 75, 614. 
81 Fig, 2005, above n 75. 
82 See Lund-Thomsen, 2005, above n 72, 630–1. 
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not necessarily reflect the expectations and desires of the intended 
beneficiaries themselves.83
Finally, it is argued that firms already help tackle poverty and other 
stakeholder concerns through their roles as investors, employers and tax 
payers. ‘Business as usual’ increases employment among the poor, provides 
new market opportunities for smallholders, increases the access of the poor to 
essential services and contributes to government taxes, which can be spent on 
anti-poverty measures. Is there an additional reason for drawing companies 
into the CSR rhetoric? In short, the business of business is business and 
practices which deviate from this goal are misguided.
 
84
 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
The South African government faces enormous challenges in addressing the 
deep imbalances in a society split by the apartheid regime. For some time 
now, it has encouraged an agenda for companies based on the foundations of 
‘triple bottom line’ reporting, the ‘inclusive approach’ and ‘corporate 
citizenship’. We have questioned the effectiveness of current initiatives in 
meeting social and economic equity challenges and development goals in 
South Africa. To be sure, companies can contribute to the social good and are 
increasingly expected to do so. There has been a tremendous ‘buy-in’ to the 
King Reports and, given the fact that no drastic changes from the previous 
two reports are evident in King III, it is safe to say that, at the very least, 
companies will continue to pay lip service to King III.  
 
However, this article argues that, whilst companies are important contributors 
to economic development, imposing on directors a legal duty to adopt an 
‘inclusive approach’ when managing their companies and requiring them to 
engage in triple bottom line reporting, creates for them inherent conflicts and 
tensions. There are already significant ambiguities surrounding the notion of 
triple bottom line reporting. In addition, expecting too much of CSR is 
unrealistic. CSR cannot meet all the needs of society. It cannot address acts of 
corporate irresponsibility, the health and safety of employees, the needs of the 
community (health and education) and the environment. We have seen above 
various arguments that companies are failing to meet their own standards, 
                                                 
83 M Blowfield, ‘Reasons to be Cheerful? What we know about CSR’s impact’ (2007) 28 Third 
World Quarterly 683, 693.  
84 See P Newell and JG Frynas, ’Beyond CSR? Business, Poverty and Social Justice: An 
Introduction’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 669, 671 and 674. 
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despite professing their commitment to CSR. This has led to our reiteration 
that the primary responsibility for protecting stakeholders remains with the 
state.  
Successful CSR initiatives require the participation of the state, a well 
mobilised civil society and companies which are willing and able to respond 
to CSR priorities. In societies characterised by marked inequalities of power 
and resources (such as South Africa), it is relatively meaningless to talk about 
partnership and cooperation between companies and stakeholders. Important 
prerequisites such as trust, leverage and the ability to enforce agreements are 
simply absent. In such settings, the state must seek both to shift norms and to 
take a direct role in overseeing companies’ actions. The state, as others have 
argued, is in a position to influence norms through its actions and need not 
simply respond to those currently existing.85 It is in a position to create an 
environment in which communities can claim and secure rights, whether 
through introducing laws which confer rights and create obligations, 
prosecuting and penalising parties which fail to observe minimum standards 
of conduct, and providing due process and adequate redress. 86 Relying on 
CSR in its present form to deliver sustainable development or meet the needs 
of company stakeholders adequately is unrealistic.87
                                                 
85 The role of the state is central, and not just in ratifying custom or in reasserting it when it is 
violated. Much more is needed if the law is to be enforced. Laws and their enforcement depend 
on stratified social structures within the framework of the state. See G Hodgson, ‘On the 
Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering’, (2009) 
43 Journal of Economic Issues 143. 
 The danger is that this 
may lead to a further erosion of the conditions necessary for the functioning 
of CSR activities. Weak enforcement of labour, environmental or human 
rights laws cannot be compensated for by relying on soft corporate 
86 P Newell ‘Citizenship, Accountability and Community: The Limits of the CSR Agenda’ 
(2005) 81 International Affairs 541, 555–7; International Council on Human Rights Policy, 
‘Beyond Voluntarism’ 2002, 1–16  
<http://www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/7/107_summary_en.pdf> at 24 June 2009. 
87 For an argument that corporate social responsibility can and must be supported by legal 
measures (unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very 
least incentivises the attainment of such standards CSR initiatives are doomed to failure), see I 
Lynch-Fannon, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Movement and Law's Empire: Is There a 
Conflict?’ (2007) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988944> at 24 June 
2009; R Barkmeyer, ‘Legitimacy as a Key Driver and Determinant of CSR in Developing 
Countries’ Paper for the 2007 Marie Curie Summer School on Earth System Governance 
(2007) 1–23 <http://www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/07SummerSchool%20-
%20Barkemeyer.pdf> at 24 June 2009; U E Ite, ‘Multinationals and CSR in developing 
countries: a case study of Nigeria’ (2004) 11 CSR And Environmental Management 1, 1–11; T 
McInerney, ‘Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of CSR’ 
(2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 171. 
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governance and CSR approaches. The South African government runs a risk 
of undermining its legitimacy through doing so. 
